In Kenya, private landowners had borne the major costs of wildlife protection–competition for forage and water, predation, transmission of diseases to livestock by game animals, and destruction of private property by game animals. This policy is unsustainable because private landowners cannot be expected to subsidise national and international conservation efforts. Recognising this, the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) introduced policies in 1989 that compensate private landowners for damages or permit them to utilise game animals found on their land. As a result, many ranchers turned to game cropping in addition to livestock. However, ad hoc and inconsistent government regulations adversely affect these conservation efforts. In this paper, we employ field data on wildlife populations and offtakes, livestock herds and sales, prices of domestic and game meat, and costs related to harvesting game and producing livestock from nine ranches in Machakos District of Kenya. From the data, we construct a multiple-use, dynamic mathematical programming range model (that is solved using GAMS). The particular policy examined is that of switching from a traditional system, where commercial ranchers do not harvest wildlife herbivores, to one where ranchers are provided economic incentives to adopt multiple use management of the range resource, but with restrictions. The effects on conservation efforts of relaxing the restriction are investigated, as are the shadow costs of the restrictions themselves. The results indicate that the success of the KWS’s conservation programs can be substantially improved if ranchers are given greater latitude in making decisions about wildlife stocks and how they are commercially exploited. However, to maintain the presence of some species that have little or no commercial value, it may be necessary to adopt particular incentives or impose regulations concerning relative species’ mixes.